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CONSENT FOR AMICUS FILING 
The Utah Medical Association ("UMA") currendy represents approximately 3,000 
physician members throughout the State of Utah. Many of these physicians routinely enter 
into arbitration agreements with their patients. UMA physicians are currendy parties in 
wrongful death lawsuits brought by the spouses and heirs of deceased patients. It is 
unfortunate, but inevitable, that such cases will continue to be filed against UMA physicians 
in the future, and that arbitration agreements will be at issue. Many UMA physicians will 
thus be directly impacted by this Court's ruling in this appeal regarding the enforceability of 
a physician-patient arbitration agreement against a deceased patient's heirs for claims of 
wrongful death. 
Accordingly, as UMA has a significant interest in the outcome of the Court's ruling 
in this appeal, all parties, Appellant Alan Abdulla, M.D., and Appellee Lisa Bybee, have 
consented to the appearance of the UMA as amicus curiae as required by Rule 25 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A Stipulation Consenting to the Filing of Amicus Brief 
by the Utah Medical Association was filed with this Court on August 3, 2006. A copy of 
this Stipulation is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The UMA hereby adopts and incorporates the Statement of Jurisdiction, Statement 
of Issues and Standard of Review set forth in the brief of Appellant. 
IMPORTANT STATUTES 
The determination regarding the enforcability of an arbitration agreement in a 
medical malpractice action is governed in part by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2003 and 2004), and the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code 
1 
Ann. §§ 78-3 la-1 through 20 (2002). Copies of these statutes are attached at 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Utah Medical Association adopts and incorporates the Statement of the Case set 
forth in the brief of Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Well-settled public policy favoring arbitration compels enforcement of arbitration 
agreements against non-signatory spouses and heirs. Both the Utah Legislature and 
Judiciary have repeatedly acknowledged and enforced a policy favoring arbitration in a 
variety of contexts, including the physician-patient relationship. In 20045 the Utah 
Legislature amended the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to specifically provide that 
arbitration agreements apply to claims brought by a person who is not a party to the 
contract. The express language of the statute reveals the Legislature's intent that arbitration 
agreements be enforced against non-signatory spouses and heirs such as Mrs. Bybee. 
In addition, fundamental principles of Utah contract law coupled with policy 
favoring broad construction of arbitration agreements compels the enforcement of the 
Arbitration Agreement in the instant case. The plain and unambiguous language of the 
Agreement demonstrates the parties express intent to bind non-signatory spouses and heirs. 
In accordance with axiomatic contract law, the Court should interpret and enforce the 
Arbitration Agreement consistent with this intent. Further, this Court has made clear that 
arbitration agreements should be construed in favor of arbitration. Thus, the Arbitration 
Agreement should be enforced against Mrs. Bybee to give effect to the parties express intent 
and uphold the policy of liberally construing arbitration agreements in favor of arbitration. 
2 
Failure to enforce the Arbitration Agreement would adversely impact Utah 
physicians and their patients. It is simply unrealistic to require the signatures of all the 
spouses and heirs in order to bind them to an arbitration agreement, particularly since they 
may not even be identified until the time of death. This would also lead to an undesirable 
invasion of the physician-patient relationship by requiring the patient to disclose 
confidential medical treatment, and even worse, requiring the patienfs spouse and heirs to 
concur in the treatment. 
Finally, if arbitration agreements were held unenforceable against heirs for claims of 
wrongful death, then they cannot be enforced against heirs for loss of consortium. This 
would create the potential for anomalous results, as heirs could litigate their claims for loss 
of consortium, while the patient must arbitrate her medical negligence claim on the same 
operative facts. 
Enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement against non-signatories such as Mrs. 
Bybee is consistent with the language of the Utah Arbitration statutes, recent amendments 
to the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, and the express language of the Agreement. In 
addition, it is essential to further the goals of the legislative and judicially declared policy 
favoring arbitration, to safeguard the physician-patient relationship, to preserve important 
privacy rights of the patient, and to give effect to the intent of the parties to the Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WELL-ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION 
COMPELS ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
AGAINST SPOUSES AND HEIRS. 
American courts, historically, refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate on the 
ground that such agreements ousted the courts from their jurisdiction. Stephen P. Bedell, 
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Lolla Harrison and Brian Grant, Arbitrability: Current Developments in the Interpretation 
and Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements, 13 J. Contemp. L. 1, 1-2 (1987). To 
remedy this anachronism, Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act of 1924. Id. 
The purpose of the Arbitration Act was to place arbitration agreements "upon the same 
footing as other contracts, where they belong . . . .55 Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc. v. Byrd. 
470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)). 
With the passage of the Arbitration Act, Congress established "a strong federal policy 
favoring arbitration.55 Harrison & Grant, supra, at 1-2; accord Shearson/American Exp., 
Inc. v. McMahon. 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (federal policy favors arbitration). In effect, "the 
Arbitration Act simply codifi[ed] the common law duty of courts to enforce the terms of 
valid contracts, and was necessitated only by the traditional reluctance of courts to enforce 
arbitration clauses.55 Harris & Grant, supra, at 1-2. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that courts must compel arbitration 
when a valid arbitration agreement exists. See e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp.. 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Southland Corp. v. Keating. 465 U.S. 2 
(1984); Perry v. Thomas. 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson. 
513 U.S. 265 (1995); Doctors Assoc. Inc. v. Cassarotto. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). Virtually 
every state has, moreover, articulated a strong policy in favor of arbitration.1 
^ See e.g., Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Public Safety. 722 N.E.2d 
441 (Mass. 2000) (strong public policy favoring arbitration); Vandenberg v. Superior 
Court. 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1999) (same); Martin v. Vance. 514 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1999) (same); Thunderstick Lodge. Inc. v. Reuer. 585 N.W.2d 819 (S.D. 1998) 
(arbitration favored); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Stinnett, 698 N.E.2d 339 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1998) (strong public policy favoring arbitration); Perez v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 
934 P.2d 732 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (same); Anthony v. Kaplan. 918 S.W.2d 174 (Ark. 
1996) (same); Prudential Securities Inc. v. Marshall. 909 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1995) 
(arbitration of disputes is strongly favored under federal and state law); White v. Kampner. 
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A. Both the Utah Legislature and Judiciary Acknowledge and Enforce 
Policy Favoring Arbitration. 
Utah law comports with its federal and state counterparts in enforcing arbitration 
agreements. In 1927 the Utah Legislature enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act, which 
mandated enforcement of arbitration agreements. 1927 Utah Laws 62. Originally, the Act 
applied only to the arbitration of existing controversies and did not cover agreements to 
arbitrate future disputes. Allred v. Educators Mutual Ins. Ass'n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 
1265 (Utah 1996). However, in 1977 the Utah Legislature amended the Act to include 
the arbitration of future disputes. Utah Code. Ann. § 78-31-1 (1977). "Thus Utah law has 
favored arbitration provisions covering future disputes since 1977." Allred. 909 P.2d at 
1265. 
The Utah Legislature further revised the Utah Arbitration Act, effective May 2003, 
"to be more comprehensive and to (1) codify existing case law interpreting arbitration 
statutes, (2) resolve ambiguities inherent within the statutes, and (3) modernize arbitration 
practice and procedure.55 Kent B. Scott and James B. Belshe, Utah's Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act: A Makeover for the Face of Arbitration. 16 Dec. Utah B. J. 26, 27 (Dec. 
2003). The Act makes clear arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable under Utah 
law, and that parties can agree to arbitrate any controversy. It provides: 
642 A.2d 1381 (Conn. 1994) (arbitration favored); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co.. 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 1989) (same); Roe v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.. 533 So.2d 279 (Fla. 
1988) (same); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Rose. 591 P.2d 281 (N.M. 1979) (strong preference 
for resolution by arbitration); Modern Const.. Inc. v. Barce. Inc.. 556 P.2d 528 (Alaska 
1976) (strong public policy favors arbitration); Grover-Diamond Assoc, v. American 
Arbitration Ass'n. 211 N.W.2d 787 (Minn. 1973) (same); lensen v. Arrow Ins. Co.. 494 
P.2d 1334 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (public policy of Arizona favors arbitration); Dominion 
Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Hart. 498 P.2d 1138 (Colo. 1972) (arbitration is favored). 
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An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration 
any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the 
parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable 
except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the 
revocation of a contract. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-107(l) (2002). Thus, if a party "show[s] an agreement to 
arbitrate,55 the court "shall. . . order the parties to arbitrate.55 Id at § 78-31a-108(l). 
It is well-established that "the goal of the Act is to encourage extra-judicial 
settlement of legal disputes.55 Pacific Development. L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36,1112, 23 
P.3d 1035. "The [Utah Arbitration] Act supports arbitration of both present and future 
disputes and reflects long-standing public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods 
of adjudicating disputes. . . ,55 Allred. 909 P.2d at 1265; accord McCoy v. Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield of Utah. 2001 UT 31,1114, 20 P.3d 901; Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359; Buzas 
Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996); DeVore v. IHC 
Hospitals. Inc.. 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994). In addition, this Court has long 
affirmed "the strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an approved, practical and 
inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion.55 Robinson & Wells v. 
Warren. 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983).2 
B. The Utah Supreme Court and the Legislature Recognize Policy 
Favoring the Use of Arbitration in the Physician-Patient Context. 
In 1996, this Court made clear that arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable 
in the physician-patient context, stating: 
y
 The Court has a well-established history in defining a general public policy that 
liberally encourages the broad enforcement of extrajudicial dispute resolution agreements 
that have been voluntarily entered into. See e ^ , Central Florida, 2002 UT 3, If 16; Buzas 
Baseball, 925 P.2d at 946; Mred, 90 P.2d at 1265; Intermountain Power Agency v. Union 
Pacific R.R. Co.. 961 P.2d 320, 325 (Utah 1988); Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady 
Systems. Inc.. 731 P.2d 475, 479-480 (Utah 1986); Lindon, 636 P.2d at 1073. 
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We emphasize preliminarily that arbitration agreements are 
favored in Utah and that no public policy requires such 
agreements to be subject to a different analysis when they are 
between physicians and patients. They are enforceable if they 
meet the standards applicable to all contracts. 
Sosa v. Paulos. 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996). In 1999, the Utah Legislature codified 
this policy by amending the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to ensure the enforcability of 
physician-patient arbitration agreements. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (1999). It also 
clarified many of the issues associated with arbitration agreements entered into in the 
physician-patient context. Among other things, § 78-14-17 specified agreement terms and 
included the information that must be provided to the patient regarding arbitration, how 
that information is to be provided to the patient, and an acknowledgment by the patient 
that she received the information. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17. The level of detail 
embodied in the statute reveals the Legislature's intent to ensure the validity and 
enforcement of arbitration agreements entered into between physicians and their patients. 
Section (7) of the statute similarly reveals the understanding of the Legislature that the 
provisions in the statute are only valid to the extent that they apply to a contract that is not 
subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(7). 
1. The Current Version of § 78-14-17 Specifically Provides that 
Non-Signatories-Such as Spouses and Heirs-are Bound by 
Arbitration Agreements Between Physicians and their Patients. 
In 2004, the Legislature brought additional clarity to arbitration agreements in the 
physician-patient context by amending § 78-14-17 to specifically prescribe that non-
signatories - such as spouses and heirs - are bound to agreements entered into by patients 
(the "2004 Amendment55). The 2004 Amendment added, inter alia^ the following 
emphasized language: 
7 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(vii) the agreement only apply to: 
(B) the claim of: 
(I) a person who signed the agreement; 
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under 
Subsection (6); and 
(III) the unborn child of the person described...; and 
(C) the claim ofa person who is not a party to the contract if the sole 
basis for the claim is an injury sustained by a person described in 
Subsection (1) (b) (vii) (B); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2004) (emphasis added). This plain and unambiguous 
language clearly illustrates the Legislature's intent to ensure the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements that - as in the instant case - expressly bind non-signatories such as spouses and 
heirs. Although the 2003 version of § 78-14-17 does not contain similar language, it also 
does not include language expressly prohibiting enforcement of arbitration agreements 
against non-signatories. See § 78-14-17 (2003). This is because the 2004 Amendment 
merely codified previously existing common law principles and policy compelling the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements against non-signatories.3 
H. UTAH LAW COMPELS ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT AGAINST THE SPOUSE AND HEIRS. 
The plaintiff/appellee does not dispute that the Arbitration Agreement is a valid 
enforceable agreement and that it would have been enforceable against Mr. Bybee had he 
survived. The question before this Court is whether the terms of this Arbitration 
Agreement can be enforced against Mr. Bybee's spouse although she was not a signatory to 
^ UMA does not address the issue of whether the 2003 or 2004 version of § 78-14-17 
applies to the instant agreement. UMA refers to the 2004 Amendment to illustrate that the 
evolution of the policy favoring arbitration in Utah unequivocally includes binding spouses 
and heirs to arbitration agreements entered into by patients. 
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the Agreement. The trial court ruled it cannot, finding that cc[i]n the instant case there is no 
factual or legal basis to allow Mr. Bybee to unilaterally bind Mrs. Bybee to an Agreement to 
Arbitrate.35 (R. at 171.) Not only does the court's ruling ignore public policy favoring 
arbitration, it is expressly premised on a misinterpretation of Utah law. 
A. Fundamental Principles of Utah Contract Law Coupled with Policy 
Favoring Arbitration Compel Enforcement of the Arbitration 
Agreement Against Mr. Bybee's Spouse. 
The Arbitration Agreement is, essentially, a contract. Pacific Development. L.C.. 
2001 UT 36 at 1111. It is axiomatic that "in interpreting a contract, the intentions of the 
parties are controlling.53 Dixon v. Pro Image. Inc.. 1999 UT 89, U 13, 987 P.2d 48 
(quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)). The Court should 
"look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties5 intentions.55 lones v. ERA Brokers 
ConsoL 2000 UT 61, f 12, 6 P.3d 1129 (quoting Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of 
State Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990)). "If the language within the four 
corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties5 intentions are determined from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language.55 Cent. Fla. Invests.. Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 
2002 UT 3,11 12, 40 P.3d 599. Further, this Court has "repeatedly held that competent 
parties are free to bargain for any term that does not require a violation of the law.55 Salt 
Lake County v. Western Dairymen Co-op.. Inc.. 2002 UT 39,1118, 48 P.3d 910; accord 
Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson. 2000 UT 64, H 15, 8 P.3d 256. 
In the present case, the plain language of the Arbitration Agreement provides: 
Article 1: Agreement to Arbitrate: We hereby agree to submit to binding 
arbitration all disputes and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and 
losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should have been 
rendered after the date of this Agreement. All claims for monetary damages 
against the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, 
corporation or partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of any of 
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them (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Physician"), must be arbitrated 
including, without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of consortium, 
wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive damages... 
We expressly intend this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for 
injuries.and losses arise out of medical care rendered or which should have been 
rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or 
heirs of the patient and any children, whether born or unborn at the time of 
the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Patient53). 
(Arbitration Agreement Art. 1) (emphasis added) (copy attached as Addendum C). This 
plain unambiguous language clearly demonstrates the parties expressly intended to submit 
to arbitration any dispute of medical negligence arising out of the care provide by the 
physician, whether it is asserted by the patient or his spouse or heirs. Indeed, this language 
specifically reveals the parties5 intent to bind the patient's spouse to the terms of the 
Agreement exactly as the Legislature endorses in the 2004 Amendment. Thus, fundamental 
principles of Utah contract law require that the Arbitration Agreement be enforced against 
Mrs. Bybee to give effect to the intent of Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla as clearly revealed by 
the plain language of the Agreement. See Dixon, 1999 UT 89 at H 13. 
In addition, this Court has made clear that arbitration "is a remedy freely bargained 
for by the parties.55 Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co.. 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 
1981). It is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret contracts in favor of arbitration, "in 
keeping with [the] policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes when the 
parties have agreed not to litigate.55 Cent. Fla. Inv., Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc, 2002 UT 3,11 
16, 40 P.3d 599. As the Court explained in Lindon: 
Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted when the 
issue contested is the scope of the clause. If the scope of an 
arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the 
clause should be construed in favor of arbitration unless it can 
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be said that it is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers 
the asserted dispute. 
Lindon, 636 P.2d at 1073 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the parties express intent to bind Mrs. Bybee to the Agreement, 
coupled with this Court's well-settled policy requiring that the Agreement be interpreted in 
favor of arbitration, mandates that the Arbitration Agreement be enforced against Mrs. 
Bybee. 
B. Utah Wrongful Death Law Compels Enforcement of the Arbitration 
Agreement Against Mr. Bybee's Spouse. 
Although Utah courts recognize that ccan action for wrongful death is an 
independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased," Utah courts have "not entirely 
separated the heirs' right from the decedent's because the heirs' right is in major part based 
on the rights of support, both financial and emotional, that run to them from the deceased." 
Tensen v. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997). In Tensen this Court 
stated: 
We have held that the wrongful death cause of action is based on 
the underlying wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed 
subject to at least some of the defenses that would have been 
available against the decedent had she lived to maintain her 
own action. 
I d at 332 (emphasis added). 
In Utah, the wrongful death cause of action is subject to defenses that could have 
been asserted against the deceased. Id, The following are examples of defenses that Utah 
courts have recognized against a decedent's heirs: 1) heirs are bound by a comparative 
negligence defense to the extent it would be enforceable against the deceased and any causes 
of action the deceased could have brought, Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 
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1155 (Utah 1998); 2) heirs are bound by the Utah Workers3 Compensation Act as to 
claims against the deceased's employer, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105 (1997); and 3) heirs 
are bound by a statute of limitations defense enforceable against the deceased and any causes 
of action the deceased could have brought. Jensen, 944 P.2d at 332. 
Had Mr. Bybee survived and sued for the alleged medical negligence at issue in this 
case, the Arbitration Agreement would clearly be binding against him to terminate litigation 
and compel arbitration. Where, as here, a patient expressly contracts to submit to 
arbitration any dispute as to medical malpractice, it must be deemed to apply to all medical 
negligence claims arising out of the care provided, whether they are asserted by the patient 
or a third party. See Jensen, 944 P.2d 327 at 332. 
In Jensen, this Court held that heirs could not maintain a wrongful death suit where 
the "injured patient. . . chose to let the statute of limitations run on the underlying personal 
injury claim35 prior to her death. In such a situation, the heirs5 wrongful death claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations.35 IcL at 332-333. 
The Tensen Court declined to separate the death from the causative wrong to permit 
a wrongful death action, where the decedent's personal injury cause of action was barred at 
the time of death, stating: 
The injured individual is not merely a conduit for the support 
of others, he is master of his own claim and he may settle the 
case or win or lose a judgment on his own injury even though 
others may be dependent upon him. 
Tensen. 944 P.2d at 322 (emphasis added) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 127, at 955 (5th ed. 1984)). This Court recognized cc[t]he 
majority of states refuse[] to allow a decedent's heirs to proceed with a wrongful death suit 
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after the decedent has settled his or her personal injury case or won or lost a judgment 
before dying." Tensen. 944 P.2d at 332-333. 
Under Jensen, as "master of his own claim/5 a patient can completely cut off the 
potential wrongful death claims of his heirs by not initiating a lawsuit prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations, either accidentally or intentionally. The heirs3 
wrongful death claim is not so separate and independent as to allow them a separate statute 
of limitations; rather, they are bound to the limitations period applicable to the patient and 
to the patient's relating course of conduct prior to death. 
If the Arbitration Agreement this case were not enforced against Mrs. Bybee, then 
under Jensen, a patient could completely cut off his spouse from asserting a claim for 
wrongful death by mere inaction, yet that same patient could not intentionally agree to the 
forum for resolution by entering into an arbitration agreement. Such a result is not only 
anomalous, but graces spouses and heirs with broader options for recourse relating to 
medical care provided to the patient than the patient himself would have had. 
i n . COURTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS ROUTINELY ENFORCE 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND THEIR 
PATIENTS AGAINST NON-SIGNATORY SPOUSES AND HEIRS. 
Cases with similar facts from other jurisdictions have enforced arbitration agreements 
against spouses and heirs. In Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375 (Colo. 2003) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 2004 WL 324431 (U.S. 2004), for example, a surviving wife filed a wrongful death 
claim alleging negligence by her husband's health care providers. The providers sought to 
submit the claim to binding arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision between the 
husband and his HMO. Applying contract construction principles, the Colorado Supreme 
Court examined the arbitration agreement and determined that the language plainly applied 
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to "any claim of medical malpractice/5 which included the wife's claim for wrongful death, 
even though she did not sign the arbitration agreement. IdL at 378-379. 
The Allen court stated: "We hold that the arbitration agreement does apply to non-
party spouses because . . . a non-party may be bound by the terms of an agreement if the 
parties so intend . . . ." IdL at 379 (emphasis added). It explained: 
Although it is true that a wrongful death claim is separate and 
distinct from a cause of action the deceased could have 
maintained had he survived, this observation is not helpful in 
determining whether separate wrongful death claims are in fact 
included within the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
agreement. Because the plain language of the agreement in this 
case refers to "all claims" including those brought for "death," 
and because we must apply a strong presumption in favor of 
arbitration, we find that the arbitration agreement applies to 
wrongful death claims. 
I d at 379-380 (emphasis added).4 
Similarly, in Mormile v. Sinclair. 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), the 
court held that a physician/patient agreement containing an arbitration provision binding 
the patient's spouse to arbitration was enforceable against the non-signatory spouse. In 
reaching its decision, the Mormile court explained: 
Mary's agreement with her physician provided for arbitration of all claims 
arising out of or relating to Sinclair's medical treatment or services, including 
the claims of any spouse or heir. There is no question the agreement was 
intended to define and bind those individuals with a potential cause of action 
if negligent treatment of Mary resulted in her injury or death, (citations 
omitted). Gary's loss of consortium claim is based on Mary's injury or 
disability allegedly resulting from Sinclair's professional negligence. An order 
compelling arbitration of Gary's claim is consistent with the language of the 
statute, subserves the legislative goals underlying section 1295, protects 
Mary's right to privacy in her relationship with her physician and ensures that 
y The Allen court went on to determine, however, that the arbitration agreement at 
issue in that case was unenforceable because it failed to comply with the requirements of the 
Colorado Health Care Availability Act. Allen. 71 P.3d at 384. 
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no third party will be able to intrude into that relationship or veto Mary's 
choices. In the balance, Mary's right to decide the terms of her medical 
treatment outweighs Gary's right to a jury trial of his loss of consortium 
claim. 
Mormile, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 725 at 730.5 
Likewise, in Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hospital. 327 N.W.2d 370 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1982), the Michigan Court of Appeals held an arbitration agreement executed by a 
deceased patient was binding upon the personal representative. The Ballard court stated: 
Any substantive impediment that would have prevented the 
decedent from commencing suit will likewise preclude suit by the 
personal representative. For example, where the decedent's 
death is the result of an injury arising out of the course of his 
employment, the estate is bound, as the decedent would have 
been, to the exclusive remedy provision of the worker's 
compensation act, and the personal representative will be 
prevented from maintaining a separate wrongful death action. 
Id. at 371 (emphasis added). 
Arbitration agreements are, moreover, routinely enforced against non-signing heirs 
in other contexts. In Tansen v. Salomon Smith Barney. Inc., 776 A.2d 816 (N.J. Super. 
App. Div. 2001), for example, beneficiaries of retirement accounts brought a negligence 
action against their father's financial advisors. The New Jersey Superior Court held that the 
^ Indeed, in California, arbitration agreements containing similar provisions are 
routinely enforced against non-signatories in medical malpractice cases. Madden v. Kaiser 
Foundation Hospitals, 131 Cal.Rptr. 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Hawkins v. Superior 
Court. 152 Cal.Rptr. 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Herbert v. Superior Court. 215 Cal.Rptr. 
477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Harris v. Superior Court. 233 Cal.Rptr. 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986); Michaelis v. Schori, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Bolanos v. 
Khalatian. 283 Cal.Rptr. 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Gross v. Recabaren. 253 Cal.Rptr. 820 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Garrison v. Superior Court. 33 Cal. Rptr.3d 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005). 
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beneficiaries5 claim arose out of the father's agreement, and thus they were bound by the 
arbitration clause. The Tansen court explained: 
Arbitrability of a particular claim "depends not upon the 
characterization of the claim, but upon the relationship of the 
claim to the subject matter of the arbitration clause.55 
Id. at 258 (quoting Wasserstein v. Kovatch. 618 A.2d 886, 286 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
1993)). 
Similarly, in Smith, Barney. Inc. v. Henry, 775 So.2d 722 (Miss. 2001), the 
Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the heirs to financial accounts could be 
compelled to arbitrate their claims relating to negligent management of the funds. The 
court rejected the plaintiflPs argument that she was a non-signatory to the agreement and an 
unintended third-party beneficiary and held that the express terms of the decedent's will 
named the plaintiff a successor to the decedent's rights and thus subjected her to arbitration. 
Id at 727. 
Additionally, in Collins v. Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner and Smith. Inc.. 561 So.2d 
952 (La. Ct. App. 1990), the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of 
a motion to compel arbitration, and held non-signatory heirs and successors were bound by 
a decedent's arbitration agreement with a brokerage firm, where the agreement expressly 
bound successors and assigns. Id. at 955. The Collins court held the defendants were 
entided to arbitration because "the Customer Agreement on its face applies to all accounts 
of a customer, whether CMA5s or otherwise, and clearly requires arbitration of all disputes 
arising out of the customer's business with Merrill Lynch.556 Id 
® Similar results have been reached in other contexts. See, e ^ , American Bureau of 
Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard. 170 F.3d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1999) (non-signatory insurance 
underwriter compelled to arbitrate); Seborowski v. Pittsburgh Press Co.? 188 F.3d 163, 
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These cases demonstrate the sound reasoning that a patient should be able to 
determine by contract the forum where medical care provided to him will be addressed. 
Decedents are able to bind their heirs through other contracts, wills and testamentary 
dispositions, so the concept is neither new or illogical. It is, moreover, the policy adopted 
by most federal and state law across the country. 
IV. FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN THIS 
CASE WILL ADVERSELY IMPACT UTAH PHYSICIANS AND THEIR 
PATIENTS. 
Under the trial court's ruling, the only way to create an enforceable arbitration 
agreement covering all claims arising out of medical care provided, including claims for 
wrongful death, would be for spouses and all potential heirs to join in the execution of the 
arbitration agreement. It is unrealistic to require the signatures of all the spouses and heirs 
to bind them to an arbitration agreement, particularly since they may not even be identified 
until the time of death. 
Requiring heirs to participate in the creation of the arbitration agreement in order to 
encompass claims of wrongful death would have the equally troublesome effect of requiring 
that family members be given some minimum level of disclosure regarding the patient's 
need for medical treatment. This may not only be at odds with the desires of the patient for 
complete confidentiality, but it would also violate the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act ("HIPAA") and preempt any judicial or statutory law to the contrary. 
As such, this approach would authorize-indeed require-an intrusion into a patient's 
168 (3d Cir. 1999) (non-signatory beneficiaries of deceased employees compelled to 
arbitrate claims alleging breach of collective bargaining agreement signed by deceased 
employees); In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz. 659 F.2d 789, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(non-signatory transport company subject to arbitration as an agent of plaintiff). 
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confidential relationship with his physician as the price for guaranteeing a third person 
access to a jury trial on matters arising from the patient's own treatment. 
Adoption of such a philosophy would violate the sanctity of the physician-patient 
relationship - a safe haven which would be severely threatened if the physician were obliged 
to obtain the signature of the patient's heirs to create an arbitration agreement. How is a 
patient to maintain privacy in his or her physician consultations when, in essence, an heir's 
intrusion into the relationship is a prerequisite to its formation? Such roadblocks to 
establishing an arbitration agreement would be at odds with Utah legislation allowing -
indeed favoring - physician-patient arbitration agreements for claims arising from the 
treatment provided. The purpose of the Utah Arbitration Act and § 78-14-17 of the Utah 
Healthcare Malpractice Act is to facilitate, not eviscerate, the favored process of arbitration. 
V. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS 
REQUIRED BY THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
The physician-patient relationship is wholly voluntary, created by agreement, express 
or implied. Garay v. County of Bexar. 810 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). The 
physician-patient relationship is in this sense contractual, and the physician and the patient 
may agree to make an arbitration agreement a term of their relationship. See Sosa v. 
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996); Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2004). The patient 
may not be denied health care for refusing to sign an arbitration agreement. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-14-17(7) (2004). Further, the physician's legal duty of care is predicated on the 
existence of this physician-patient relationship. See Dalley v. Utah Regional Med. Ctr.. 791 
P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1990); Farrow v. Health Servs. Corp.. 604 P.2d 474, 496 (Utah 
1979). Accordingly, claims by a patient's wife for damages allegedly caused by medical 
negligence, he,, wrongful death, are predicated on her husband's physician-patient 
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relationship. As the heirs5 claims are premised on the physician-patient relationship, they 
must be subject to the agreed-upon terms of that relationship: the Arbitration Agreement. 
In this case, the physician-patient relationship between the decedent and his 
physician is the point of origin for any malpractice claim against the physician, by either his 
wife, the estate, or any other heir. It was the decedent who entered into the physician-
patient relationship with Dr. Abdulla, and they undisputedly contracted to make the 
Arbitration Agreement a term of their physician-patient relationship. Although Mrs. Bybee 
and the other heirs are not signatories to the Agreement, they are bound by it as it defines 
the scope and conditions of the physician-patient relationship that forms the basis for their 
claims. 
The necessity of this result is well-illustrated in the informed consent context. Under 
Utah informed consent law, the physician has a duty to disclose to his patient "risks of 
injury [that] might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment.55 Lounsbury v. CapeL 
836 P.2d 188,193 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). A 
physician5s duty of disclosure arises from the physician-patient relationship and is owed to 
the patient, not to the patient's spouse or other family members. Id. at 198. The decision 
whether or not to agree to treatment in light of the risks is vested in the patient. Id at 197. 
If the patient agrees to treatment and consents to the risks attendant thereto, his wife is 
bound by his consent. She could not file a loss of consortium or wrongful death claim on 
the basis that she did not personally consent to the risks of treatment, or did not sign the 
informed consent document. Thus, the concept of investing the competent patient with 
complete and unbridled decision-making power relative to his/her care and all claims arising 
therefrom, is fundamental to the physician-patient relationship under Utah law. 
19 
VI. FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WILL 
CREATE THE POTENTIAL FOR ANOMALOUS RESULTS WHEN 
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM AND SURVIVAL CLAIMS ARE ALSO 
ASSERTED. 
A. Loss of Consortium. 
If, as the trial court here ruled, arbitration agreements are held to be unenforceable 
against spouses and heirs for claims of wrongful death, then arbitration agreements would 
also be held unenforceable against non-signing spouses for claims of loss of consortium. 
This would conflict with the fact that a loss of consortium claim is by statute a derivative 
claim subject to all of the same defenses as the underlying negligence claim. Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-2-11 (1998). 
Moreover, if non-signatories are not bound to arbitrate claims of loss of consortium 
arising out of medical care rendered by the physician, they could proceed to litigate that 
claim while the patient would be compelled to arbitrate claims for medical negligence 
arising out of the same medical care. The physician would have to answer in both 
arbitration and in a civil suit for claims dependent on the same operative facts regarding the 
professional standard of care, its breach by the defendant and causation of injury to the 
patient. This result is contrary to the purpose of the Arbitration Act, no savings would be 
effected, and there would be the potential for conflicting results. 
B. Survival Claims. 
The failure to enforce arbitration agreements against spouses heirs for claims of 
wrongful death would also be inconsistent with Utah law governing survival claims. Utah 
law is clear that wrongful death and survival claims are separate and distinct claims, allowing 
recovery of separate and distinct damages. Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 
242, 2476 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). However, Utah law also provides that the personal 
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representative of a decedent's estate is bound by contracts signed by the decedent. See In re 
Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982); see also Colorado Nad Bank of Denver v. 
Friedman. 846 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). Thus, a survival claim is subject to an 
arbitration agreement by the decedent. 
Wrongful death claims often go hand-in-hand with survival claims, as the starting 
point for both actions is an injury resulting in the decedent's death. If arbitration 
agreements were held to be unenforceable against heirs for claims of wrongful death, then 
the survival and wrongful death claims could be separated between the courts and 
arbitration. The result would be unworkable, inefficient, and would create the potential for 
conflicting results. 
CONCLUSION 
The reasons requiring the non-signing spouse heirs to be bound by an Arbitration 
Agreement are far more convincing than any arguments to avoid enforcement of that 
Agreement. It is not only consistent with the language of the Utah Arbitration statutes and 
recent amendments to the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, it is essential to further the 
goals of the legislative and judicially declared policy favoring arbitration, to safeguard the 
physician-patient relationship, to preserve important privacy rights of the patient, and to 
give effect to the intent of the parties to the Agreement. 
DATED this 3 0 day of August, 2006. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
E L S i r t l j . WILLIAMS 
KURTM. FRANKENBURG 
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Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Utah Medical 
Association 130280.1 
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641 JUDICIAL CODE 78-14-17 
(3) Per diem reimbursement to panel members and ex-
penses incurred by the panel in the conduct of prelitigatdon 
panel hearings shall be paid by the division. Expenses related 
to subpoenas are paid by the requesting party, including 
witness fees and mileage. 
(4) The proceedings are informal and formal rules of evi-
dence are not applicable. There is no discovery or perpetuation 
of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of 
the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraor-
dinary circumstances. 
(5) (a) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with 
counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except upon 
special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of 
the parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed to 
the public. 
(b) No party has the right to cross-examine, rebut, or 
demand that customary formalities of civil trials and 
court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however, 
request special or supplemental participation of some or 
all parties in particular respects. 
(c) Communications between the panel and the parties, 
except the testimony of the parties on the merits of the 
dispute, are disclosed to all other parties. 
(6) The division shall appoint a panel to consider the claim 
and set the matter for panel review as soon as practicable after 
receipt of a request. 
(7) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings 
before a panel. ISM 
78*14-14. Decision and r ecommenda t ions of panel — 
No judicial or other review. 
The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than 
30 days after the end of the proceedings. The panel shall 
determine on the basis of the evidence whether each claim 
against each health care provider has merit or has no merit 
and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained of re-
sulted in harm to the claimant 
There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's 
decision or recommendations. ltes 
78-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in 
subsequent action — Panelist may not be 
compelled to testify —- Immunity of panelist 
from civil liability — Information regarding 
professional conduct. 
(1) Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical 
review panel and its results, opinions, findings, and determi-
nations are not admissible as evidence in an action subse-
quently brought by the claimant in a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
(2) No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action 
subsequently filed with regard to the subject matter of the 
panel's review. A panelist has immunity from civil liability 
arising from participation as a panelist and for all communi-
cations, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the course 
and scope of duties prescribed by this section. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to prohibit 
the division from considering any information contained in a 
statutory notice of intent to commence action, request for 
prelitigation panel review, or written findings of a panel with 
respect to the division's determining whether a licensee en-
gaged in unprofessional or unlawful conduct. ISM 
78-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitra-
tion hearing upon written agreement of par-
ties — Compensation to members of panel. 
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may 
be considered a binding arbitration hearing and proceed under 
Title 78, Chapter 31a, except for the selection of the panel, 
which is done as set forth in Subsection 78-14-12(4). If the 
proceeding is considered an arbitration proceeding, the parties 
are equally responsible for compensation to the members of 
the panel for services rendered. ises 
78-14-17. Arbitration agreements. 
(1) After May 2,1999, for a binding arbitration agreement 
between a patient and a health care provider to be validly 
executed or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not 
been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing and by verbal 
explanation, the following information on: 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate 
a claim instead of having the claim heard by a judge 
or jury, 
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in 
which arbitrators are selected under the agreement; 
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitra-
tion-related costs under the agreement; 
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into 
the agreement and still receive health care if Subsec-
tion (2) applies; 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each 
year unless the agreement is canceled in writing 
before the renewal date; 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about 
the arbitration agreement answered; and 
(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agree-
ment within 30 days of signing the agreement; and 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all 
persons claiming damages; 
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care 
provider; 
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all 
persons claiming damages and the health care pro-
vider from a list of individuals approved as arbitra-
tors by the state or federal courts of Utah; 
(iv) all parties waive the requirement of Section 
78-14-12 to appear before a hearing panel in a mal-
practice action against a health care provider; 
(v) the patient be given the right to rescind the 
agreement within 30 days of signing the agreement; 
and 
(vi) the term of the agreement be for one year and 
that the agreement be automatically renewed each 
year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by 
the patient or health care provider before the renewal 
date. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be 
denied health care of any kind from the emergency depart-
ment of a general acute hospital, as defined in Section 26-21-2, 
on the sole basis that the patient or a person described in 
Subsection (5) refused to enter into a binding arbitration 
agreement with a health care provider. 
(3) A written acknowledgment of having received a written 
and verbal explanation of a binding arbitration agreement 
signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a 
claim that the patient did not receive a written and verbal 
explanation of the agreement as required by Subsection (1) 
unless the patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement 
lacked the capacity to do so; or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the 
execution of the agreement was induced by the health 
care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
(4) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a 
claim governed by a binding arbitration agreement that was 
executed or renewed before May 3, 1999. 
(5) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 
78-14-5(4), except a person temporarily standing in loco pa-
rentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration agree-
ment on behalf of a patient. 
(6) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement 
that is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 
et seq. MOS 
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78-14-17. Arbitration agreements. 
W After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement 
between a patient and a health care provider to be validly 
executed or> if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not 
been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following 
information on: 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate 
a claim instead of having the claim heard by a judge 
or jury; 
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in 
which arbitrators are selected under the agreement; 
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitra-
tion-related costs under the agreement; 
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into 
the agreement and still receive health care if Subsec-
tion (3) applies; 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each 
year unless the agreement is canceled in writing 
before the renewal date; 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about 
the arbitration agreement answered; 
(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agree-
ment within ten days of signing the agreement; and 
(viii) the right of the patient to require mediation 
, of the dispute prior to the arbitration of the dispute; 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(i) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b)(ii), a 
panel of three arbitrators shall be selected as follows: 
(A) one arbitrator collectively selected by all 
persons claiming damages; 
(B) one arbitrator selected by the health care 
provider; and 
(C) a third arbitrator: 
(I) jointly selected by all persons claiming 
damages and the health care provider; or 
(II) if both parties cannot agree on the 
selection of the third arbitrator, the other 
two arbitrators shall appoint the third arbi-
trator from a list of individuals approved as 
arbitrators by the state or federal courts of 
Utah; or 
(ii) if both parties agree, a single arbitrator may be 
selected; 
(iii) all parties waive the requirement of Section 
78^14-12 to appear before a hearing panel in a mal-
practice action against a health care provider; 
(iv) the patient be given the right to rescind the 
agreement within ten days of signing the agreement; 
(v) the term of the agreement be for one year and 
th^t the agreement be automatically renewed each 
yefcr unless the agreement is canceled in writing by 
th$ patient or health care provider before the renewal 
date; 
(vi) the patient has the right to retain legal coun-
sel; 
(vii) the agreement only apply to: 
(A) an error or omission that occurred after 
the agreement was signed, provided that the 
agreement may allow a person who would be a 
proper party in court to participate in an arbitra-
tion proceeding; 
(B) the claim of: 
(I) a person who signed the agreement; 
(II) a person on whose behalf the agree-
ment was signed under Subsection (6); and 
(III) the unborn child of the person de-
scribed in this Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B), for 
12 months from the date the agreement is 
signed; and 
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to 
the contract if the sole basis for the claim is an 
injury sustained by a person described in Sub-
section (l)(b)(vii)(B); and 
(c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to: 
(i) read the written information required by Sub-
section (l)(a) and the arbitration agreement; and 
(ii) ask any questions. 
(2) When a medical malpractice action is arbitrated, the 
action shall: 
(a) be subject to Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act; and 
(b) include any one or more of the following when 
requested by the patient before an arbitration hearing is 
commenced: 
(i) mandatory mediation; 
(ii) retention of the jointly selected arbitrator for 
both the liability and damages stages of an arbitra-
tion proceeding if the arbitration is bifurcated; and 
(iii) the filing of the panel's award of damages as a 
judgement against the provider in the appropriate 
district court. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be 
denied health care on the sole basis that the patient or a 
person described in Subsection (6) refused to enter into a 
binding arbitration agreement with a health care provider. 
(4) A written acknowledgment of having received a written 
explanation of a binding arbitration agreement signed by or on 
behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a claim that the 
patient did not receive a written explanation of the agreement 
as required by Subsection (1) unless the patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement 
lacked the capacity to do so; or i 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the 
^execution of the agreement was induced by the health 
tare provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a 
claiiQ governed by a binding arbitration agreement that was 
executed or renewed before May 3, 1999. 
(6) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 
78-14-5(4), except a person temporarily standing in loco pa-
rentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration agree-
ment on behalf of a patient. 
(7) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement 
that is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 
et seq. 2004 
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identifying information from the bureau, in the form 
established by the bureau. A court of competent jurisdic-
tion or a child placing agency licensed under Title 62A, 
Chapter 4a, Part 6, may accept that request from the 
adult adoptee or adult sibling, in the form provided by the 
bureau, and transfer that request to the bureau. The 
adult adoptee or adult sibling is responsible for notifying 
the bureau of any change in information contained in the 
request. 
(b) The bureau may only release identifying informa-
tion to an adult adoptee or adult sibling when it receives 
requests from both the adoptee and his adult sibling. 
(c) After matching the request of an adult adoptee with 
that of his adult sibling, if the bureau has been provided 
with sufficient information to make that match, the bu-
reau shall notify both the adoptee and the adult sibling 
that the requests have been matched, and disclose the 
identifying information to those parties. 
(3) Information registered with the bureau under this sec-
tion is available only to a registered adult adoptee and his 
registered birth parent or registered adult sibling, under the 
terms of this section. 
(4) Information regarding a birth parent who has not reg-
istered a request with the bureau may not be disclosed. -
(5) The bureau may charge a fee for services provided under 
tJiis section, limited to the cost of providing those services. 
1995 
78-30-19. Restrictions on disclosure of information — 
Violations — Penalty. 
(1) Information maintained or filed with the bureau under 
this chapter may not be disclosed except as provided by this 
chapter, or pursuant to a court order. 
(2) Any person who discloses information obtained from the 
bureau's voluntary adoption registry in violation of this chap-
ter, or knowingly allows that information to be disclosed in 
violation of this chapter is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
1987 
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78-31a-102. Definitions. 
78-31a-103. Notice. 
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arbitrator. 
78-31a-120. Award. 
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78-31a-122. Remedies — Fees and expenses of a rb i t r a l 
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78-31a-124. Vacating an award. 
78-31a-125. Modification or correction of award. 
78-31a-126. Judgment on award — Attorney's fees fli 
litigation expenses. 
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78-31a-l to 78-31a-20. Repealed. 20< 
78-31a-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as Out "\ftah \5inionn Arhitratto 
Act." 2(M 
78-31a-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Arbitration organization* means an associate 
agency, board, commission, or other entity that is neutr* 
and initiates, sponsors, or administers an arbitratio 
proceeding or is involved in the appointment of an afb 
trator. 
(2) "Arbitrator" means an individual appointed to rer 
der an award, alone or with others, in a controversy ths 
is subject to an agreement to arbitrate. 
(3) "Court" means a court of competent jurisdiction i 
this state. / 
(4) "Knowledge* means actual knowledge. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, bus] 
ness trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liabilit 
company, association, joint venture, government, govern 
mental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, pufcli 
corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(6) "Record" means information that is inscribed on « 
tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or othe 
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. 200 
78-31a-lQ3. Notice. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a persoi 
gives notice to another person by taking action that is reason 
ably necessary to inform the other person in ordinary course 
whether or not the other person acquires knowledge of th< 
notice. 
(2) A person has notice if the person has knowledge of tin 
notice or has received notice. 
(3) A person receives notice when it comes to the person's 
attention or the notice is delivered at the person's place o 
residence or place of business, or at another location held oul 
by the person as a place of delivery of such communications. 
2«M 
78-31a-104. Application. 
(1) This chapter applies to any agreement to arbitrate made 
on or after May 6, 2002. 
c 
MAR-08-05 13:17 FROM- T-873 P.011/021 F-677 
0 S / e e / 0 6 041Xlam P- «©4 
H | l e }. i n r r r r n e n r t o flrbrrrofc? We Kereb7 ogroc Io submil lo binding orb lire lion oil diipulei ond clojms for domogcs of ony Wild 
loi .n , r . « ond kmc* oming Irom rhe medico* ccr, rendered or which should hovo been rendered after fhe doll cl In* A g / M ^ n l AW d o * * for 
^cne.orr domeges ogolnsi me phys.don. or>rl * . , p h y ^ ' J pf l f lnm o^ocioios oiwcioHon. corporol^ o/ p«m.nh.p ond the " g o * " * 
S . " J , * of ony oi them Ihereinefie. crfodfrtfy referred to o> " P h Y S . W L mini bo orbilroied feck** w*»Ko*l !im-oi«i. do-es lor 
Phenol,n,ury. loss of consortium, wrongfuld*eh,.molionoldisire* orpun.iive demeges. W e epeelhor Ihe PhysTctonmoy pufiut o looofeaon 
.* coitci ony I t t from ihe porter* end dote* *> * ° » *>« ~cW* me Phy* cion's righl lo compel orbilroborI of or* molproclice doim H o - * e i 
la|,o~.nc ih7o«cfiio« of ony molproclice elcim 0fiO.wf me Phy*c»on. ony fee dispute, whether or nor ih* subject of ony " ' " tag lego) ecnon. ihall 
cho be/uolTtd by orMroKcA.
 t . 
w f upreuiy .nlend Ihol this Agwrneni wall bind oil personi whoie clcims lor injuries ond losses orist OyJ Of medicol core rendered o« 
-»,cr ihould hove been rendered by Phyikion o*ler th« ooie of ihis Agreement, including ony spouse or heirs of the paliem ond an, cmie'rtn, 
-neihcr bow or unborn ol ihe lime of ihe ©ccir.snce giving rise Io ony claim (hereinafter collectively r*Utn4 TO O I "POI?**!!"! 
Article 3. Weiv»r of Rjflhe to Tflch w § c»pre*sfy wofv« oil righto fo pursue ony legal ociion ro sett demeges or ony other remedies •# 
e cou'i of low. including Ihe dghl lo o jury or court iric!. excepl )o enforce our decision Io orbilroie. io coMed ony orbliroilon o-oio ond to focifiiafi 
,*t t.'D'i'0»»on process OJ permiHnd by Ihe U»en Arburofion Act 
Af»ide 3: procedure? grid A p p e ^ n m n r of AMtrororsi »ai«nl she! wrve Physidon by certified moil w*ln o «*»Ulrn demand Jo 
eion'oNo* -Nch *hoR specify ?h« nowe or /he tlcim. the dole ol the cloimed occurrence, rhe complained of conduct by Ihe PhyaCion. ond ( 
oaicoi'on o1 rhe Patient's injuries ond demegos. Within 60 doy* ahtr rhe demand. Ihe poriias iholl ogree upon o neurrd orbilroior io be if lecrti 
i,Dfl, Q |,,» 0 | .ndMduofs epprovfid oi orbllfolofi by ihe Siole or Ftdcrol cowrU of Uioh. 1/ Ihe pe/Vei connol ogre* upon o nnUrol orbiiroloi. ihi 
court vKoll idecl fin individuol from ihol hi Tre neuiral orbih-slor iholi: preside over Ihe o/bJ|roKork heortng ond pre-orbirrolton conlt/encei 
f »)obi.»n xheduhng orders: supervise |he conduct of discovery ro prevent obnrse ond wore effldency ond eosr-effeahreness: rule on oil /nolionj 
»Adue>*g moiion> for summary judgmcnl ond noham 'o dhmi'si lor foitu#e lo proceed w|th recsonable diligence; odminitfer ooih\;mwt svbpoeno: 
u^ <s »ter:ue other powen gronfed lo oibiuewrt t ;*t Uioh Aibiirouon Acr Within sin mon/hs of ihe demand for orbiirotion or os oihexviie order* 
by >nt A»UMQI o/biiroior. Poiivnt shoR soleci o^i orbifroior ond Physiaon shod jeled one orbiirotor. Porlenf ond Phys'iden thofl poy Ihc fees on 
«*per>e> •&! n<i or ner own arbitrator. Ecch <ao.iy jthoA snare eq^elly rhe expenses ar\i feci of the neulral orbiuotor. The pcrnei egree ihol m 
e-o.f eior% novo rhs immuniry of o fudiciol o\uiftr from civil Ifcbifiry when edlng in ihe copodry ol on orbirrolor under ihil Agreemenr 
AL' cia^ns bosed on Ihe some occurrence, incideni, o/ cere sholl be erbiira;ed in one proceeding; however, Pollen! or Phynaen k«gfl no^ 
me sbsolutt right lo orblirole leporolely i i iuti cl Jiobifiry ond domege vrpen wr(n«n rtqueii to the neulrol arbitnoioi. Arbilrohon hcormg) wit) b 
^eio n» *ne Counry of ihe Physidon'i pfmopol pl< c« of builnest or elsewhere oi rhe periftt rnoy agree. 
fhe pcr'its comeni re Ihe pomopoiion in iU.\ arbirronon of ony per>on or eniiry ihol would orhee«r'ue be Q proper oddihonoi poriy ,n o cov 
r:no-i era vhlch ogrees to be bound by rhe crcii'oiion decision Any en'iling court ccDon ogoins? such oddiiionof pcrioi* or enivy >heN be sfoye 
.co* ogi^o/rem lo oorlicipois in the orbilroKcn 
The porhes ogree ihol ihe orb: fro lion proceedings ore pnvoic, noi public, ond ihe pri*ocy of fhc pontes and of ihe orbiiraiion proceeoinc 
sho'1 oe preserved. 
Article 4: App4?^oMf I g w ; With tnpr cl ro ony moner ncf heroin oxpresily pto*itl*4 for, ihe orbilroJfon sholl be governed by me wire 
ArD.frar.on Acr All provfslons of the Uioh H*o:»h Caro Molp/ccitce Acr. w,ln the cscepiion of ihe notice of intent tin^ pre-Tmgcmon heonn 
reow.rtrronn which rhe ponies hereby wor-e. JrVsIJ oppfy ro Ihe orb»lro»ion The comporo||Te foub provisions ol Utoh low zpp^f ro ihe o/bwionc 
znc **9 orbirioior* aholl oppornon fouir ro c\\ pursom or on»ii.*j «ho caniribwied to lh« domed injury whether or not rhey o/e paritmi ro »r 
3.*0iiro»on 
A m d c 5: Rr f9^ t |o f l? H»»» Ag/e«mrnr * e y be revoked by w»ntn notice molltd Jo the Physic«n. by certified moil, virnm 30 doys oh 
i«ono/wf t, ond .1 not revoked iholl govern oil oetficd »ervice> recew-ed by Ihe Pollen! ofier the dote of mi* Ag/eemcnl. 
Arriclt 65 ZpsM The ifirm of rhis Agrotniiv li one year from rhe dor. || i3 a, f l f ted. II shofl be duromoli'colfy renewed from y*or to ye« 
'ntt,9ori«. yn/fl» eilhor perry io ih.s AgrsemeAl MH,fies ihe ether ol his or her eUclion not lo renew in wrSnng delivered by certified mail prior * « 
•**-c~c! dor« ' r 
A r r i r ! e 7 :
 f *** ™4 V n f t r i h y d l I ifcl/cm or Panem's lepreseniohvej hove reod oncf | undcrslond ihe above Ao/eemenl wh,ch h, 
see.n
 t 9 ,oeiy bxplo^ed to me jo my ier„focncn I wnderilond ihol I hove rhe righr to hove my qu«sl.ons ebour erbftrclion o.-iswf red end I do n 
^ovt- anv uwswered oweshoni. I c«cu.e /h* o^/eimenl o' my c -n free will ond nor under ony duress, ond I undcrslond ihol my l in ing if 
e$i**men/ »i noi a /equirement in order io recuivf. me die of services from PhySiCion 
A f f ' < ^ ** RefeivedgopY? I hove receded o copy of this document. 
PS^^PK^t^ 4f^/c A. T?,^ 
nieni G/PQUQM'I 
&£—*$.?& 
lOoi.i 
